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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the use by insiders of private information in their decision to 
exercise executive stock options. It is the first to categorise the exercise of an executive stock 
option by the proportion of stock sold at exercise. Consistent with existing research, exercises 
overall do not yield subsequent abnormal returns. However, we find a marked and significant 
difference in subsequent performance between exercises categorised as ‘high’ and ‘low’ sale 
proportion respectively. Therefore, while the exercise decision may appear uninformed, this 
study demonstrates that executives do use private information in their exercise and 
corresponding sale decisions. Further, near-the-money exercises produce negative abnormal 
returns, consistent with such exercises being relatively expensive. These results need to be 
reflected in the valuation of executive stock options, and hence the compensation executives 
derive from them. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economists have frequently investigated the impact of insiders’ trades in their own 
stock. Superficially, such research identifies the predictive ability of insiders’ trades and 
therefore the benefit to outside investors of conditioning their own trades on those of the 
insiders. More importantly, the principal motivation for research in this area is to determine if 
insiders’ trades are informative. If this is the case, then it must follow that insiders are able to 
profit from their informational advantage. The predominant focus of existing research has 
been to examine the information implied in the purchase and sale of stock in their own firms 
by executives. This research shows consistently that there is information content in these 
trades, most significantly in relation to stock purchases, and has been documented both for 
the US and the UK. More recent research extends this analysis to investigate the information 
content of executive stock option exercises.  
Executives are increasingly being remunerated by means of performance based 
remuneration packages that incorporate executive stock options. Their ability to use their 
private information in determining when to exercise their stock options will impact directly 
upon the level of remuneration they receive from the firm. In turn, if insiders’ private 
information does influence their exercise decisions, this needs to be accounted for in the 
valuation of executive stock options.  
The initial view regarding stock option exercises was that they should have little 
predictive ability given that executives may have only a limited ability to time their exercises. 
Any discretion they may have to use their private information would imply an exercise and 
sale prior to a period of poor stock price performance. The exercise of an option requires the 
executive to pay the exercise price, and therefore it is argued that an executive has no 
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incentive to exercise unless he intends to sell the stock immediately. If the executive expects 
the price of the underlying stock to rise, it is cheaper to hold the option. Thus the option 
should only be exercised if the holder expects the market price to fall. It is therefore generally 
agreed that if insiders use their private information in exercising a stock option, an exercise 
should be viewed by investors as a sell signal, assuming that the executive is free to sell the 
shares purchased through the option exercise.1 
Carpenter and Remmers (2001) examine the information contained in stock option 
exercises by executives in the US in some detail. They find that where an executive can sell 
immediately, post-exercise returns are marginally positive but not significant. This is in 
contrast to the/  expectation that post-exercise returns should be negative. They conclude that 
the positive abnormal returns are caused by momentum (despite the fact that they control for 
a momentum effect). The implication of their results is that insiders do not appear to use their 
information advantage with respect to option exercises. Their analysis, however, is predicated 
upon the assumption that directors sell all the stock relating to the exercise. This is based on 
Ofek and Yermack’s (2000) finding that ‘for executives who exercise stock options, we find 
near-total selling of the shares acquired’. This is clearly not the case in the UK, where we 
find that executives sell on average approximately 45% of the shares purchased at exercise. 
Table 1 presents additional summary statistics. 
The main focus of this research is to extract the information that may be contained in 
option exercises. In particular, we distinguish between exercises where executives sell a 
small or large proportion of the stock purchased at exercise. Such a distinction is important if 
we are to determine whether the exercise of stock options is information or liquidity driven. 
                                                 
1 This scenario may be confused by option expiry, which forces the executive to exercise irrespective of his 
expectations regarding future performance. 
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If there is any information content in the exercise of an executive stock option, then a priori 
we would expect negative post-exercise performance after an exercise that is accompanied by 
a proportionately large sale of stock. An exercise and low sale proportion might be more 
analogous to a stock purchase, and would therefore be followed by positive post-exercise 
performance. Table 2 shows that this is indeed the case. 
 The remainder of the paper investigates further the factors that may impact on the 
nature of these post-exercise returns. Controlling for the moneyness of the option at exercise 
is important as the moneyness has implications for the costs associated with exercising the 
option. A priori, we would expect a near-the-money option exercise to be a ‘better’ signal of 
poor future performance than a deep in-the-money exercise. While we obtain results that are 
consistent with this intuition, the importance of the proportion sold persists when we control 
for the impact of option moneyeness. Finally, we examine the relevance of both the size of 
the firm and the age of the executive at the time of exercise. 
The existing research identifies both private information and issues relating to the 
nontransferability of executive stock options as being possible motivations for their exercise. 
The findings of this existing research are, however, very limited. In particular, there is no 
conclusive evidence that executives use their private information when exercising their stock 
options. This paper represents a significant contribution to this literature on insider trading. 
We provide evidence that insiders do incorporate private information in their exercise 
decisions. This private information is reflected both in the timing of their option exercises 
and in the related decision of how much of the stock purchased through exercise should be 
sold.  
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2.  Literature 
 
There has been a plethora of literature on insider trading in equity markets, 
particularly over the last three decades since Fama (1970) stimulated the debate on tests of 
strong-form efficiency. Recognising that it is difficult to identify private information ex ante, 
one strand of the literature attempts to isolate those individuals who are most likely to be 
privy to information which is not in the public domain. Research in this area examines the 
stock price reaction to insider trades. This includes the U.S. studies by Jaffe (1974), Finnerty 
(1976), Givoly and Palman (1985), Seyhun (1986, 1988, 1992), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), 
Pettit and Venkaatesh (1995) and Eckbo and Smith (1998). These examine the information 
content of insider trades by looking at the behaviour of abnormal returns around insider 
transactions. Similar studies have been conducted in the UK by King and Roell (1988), Pope, 
Morris and Peel (1990), Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis (1994), and Gregory, Matatko 
and Tonks (1997). The general consensus is that there is information contained in insider 
trades. In particular, insider purchases, which are less likely to be liquidity driven, are more 
informative than sales. The most recent research relating to the impact of insider trading in 
the US by Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2000) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) uses a more 
robust method of calculating abnormal returns than the earlier research. The conclusion is 
that insider purchases have predictive ability over holding periods up to a year, but insider 
sales have no information regarding future stock returns. Finally, the information content of 
purchases is limited to the smaller firms. 
Whereas the focus of the above literature has been on standard equity transactions, the 
aim here is to examine the information content of executives’ trades with regard to the 
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exercise of executive stock options. Executive stock options are a form of performance based 
incentive compensation. Their desired effect is to align the long-term interests of 
shareholders and managers by making managers’ payoff contingent on the stock market 
performance of the firm. The majority of the existing literature examines the exercise policies 
of the holders of stock options. This research has been both in an empirical and theoretical 
context, with emphasis being given to identifying the factors that motivate exercise 
behaviour. The main determinants of exercise behaviour that have been proposed are private 
information and option nontransferability. 
Perhaps the earliest study to examine how private information may motivate early 
exercise is that of Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968). They examine the statistical properties of 
their data on insider transactions, and report that non-option purchases account for only 30 
per cent of total purchases. They interpret the lack of previous studies on the predictive 
implications of insider option exercise as surprising. Intuition, they argue, would suggest that 
option exercise is a bearish signal. However, this is only so if exercise is followed by a 
subsequent sale. Given the lack of data on compensating sales in the same month as an option 
exercise, it may be difficult, they argue, to interpret the information signal given by an option 
exercise. 
The first study to concentrate solely on the information signal given by insider option 
exercises is that of Carpenter and Remmers (2001). Using data for all corporate insider option 
exercises taking place in the U.S. during the period 1984-1995, they examine stock price 
performance following insider option exercise. Specifically, they examine whether corporate 
insiders use private information about the expected price of their firms’ stock in the timing of 
their option exercises. A priori, they hypothesise that in a regime (post-May 1991) where 
insiders can sell freely shares bought by exercising options, the use of private information 
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should manifest itself in negative abnormal stock returns following such exercises. In this 
current regime, they find that executives do not appear to use private information to inform 
their exercise decisions. Post-exercise returns are marginally positive but insignificant. 
Accepting that there may be non-information reasons behind an exercise decision2, they 
attempt to isolate information-based exercises by partitioning their sample in various ways. 
First, arguing that the informational asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is likely to be 
inversely related to firm size, they examine option exercises in firms categorised as large, 
medium and small. Second, they consider the possibility that higher ranked insiders may be 
better informed about the future prospects of the firm by distinguishing between exercises 
carried out by presidents or chairmen of the board (higher ranked) and lower ranked insider 
exercises. They find no evidence consistent with insiders using their information advantage 
in their exercise decision in the current regime, except for a very small subsample composed 
of top managers in the smaller firms. This subsample yields six-month post-exercise 
abnormal returns of –5.22% (t-statistic of –2.45). 
An important feature of executive stock options is their nontransferability. Huddart 
(1997) notes that the inability to hedge such an option position may allow factors such as risk 
preferences and wealth to affect the timing of the exercise decision. For example, an option 
holder with liquidity requirements or one who wishes to diversify firm-specific risk may, 
quite rationally, decide to exercise some proportion of their holdings before maturity. Early 
exercise can therefore occur because no market exists where these instruments can be traded. 
Huddart and Lang (1996) examine patterns in the exercise of employee stock options, and 
find that exercise typically occurs well before expiration with often over half the time-value 
                                                 
2 Examples may include option expiration, employment termination, dividend realisation, diversification and 
liquidity or tax purposes. 
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of the option being sacrificed. Furthermore, they show that exercise activity is a function of 
the remaining option term, recent stock price movements, option moneyness, the vesting 
schedule and the proportion of the grant remaining unexercised. The results are consistent 
with Huddart (1994) who examines the effects of nontransferability and risk aversion in a 
theoretical framework. While risk-neutral employees only exercise at expiration, it is shown 
that risk-averse individuals may find it optimal to exercise prior to expiration. 
In a related study, Hemmer, Matsunaga and Shelvin (1996) investigate the exercise of 
options prior to expiration. Examining 110 option exercises by top executive officers in 1990, 
they show a positive relation exists between option exercise and the investment risk inherent 
in holding an option position as proxied by the variability of returns. Thus the greater the 
volatility of executive stock option returns, the more investment risk the executive is exposed 
to, and the more likely they are to exercise early. Since executives are unable to sell the 
options or short sell the underlying asset, early exercise occurs primarily to diversify an 
investment portfolio.  
 
3.  Data 
 
As observed by previous researchers, investigating the information content of 
exercises can be complicated by changes to both the rules regarding the exercise of options 
and the way in which any resulting gains are taxed. (See, for example, Carpenter and 
Remmers (2001) and Huddart (1997)). In the UK an important change in the tax treatment of 
profits on executive stock options was introduced as a result of The Greenbury Report, 
published on Monday 17 July 1995. This report represented an attempt by the Greenbury 
committee to examine executive remuneration and make recommendations for a code of best 
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practice against which the remuneration policy of public companies could be judged. Among 
the report’s findings was the recommendation that the exercise of executive stock options 
should incur income tax rather than capital gains tax, and was implemented by the 
Government with immediate effect. Given that the capital gains tax rate is the same as the 
upper level income tax rate, the predominant impact of the change is that income tax is now 
due at the time of exercise. Previously, capital gains tax had been due not at exercise but on 
the sale of the shares purchased at exercise. Under this new regime, there is no longer an 
incentive to exercise and hold in order to postpone a tax liability. Further, there may be an 
incentive to sell some shares not just to pay the exercise price but also to meet a resulting 
income tax liability.  
 We analyse the period from 17 July 1995. This period covers the new tax regime for 
executive stock options, and as a result means that there should be no tax related impact on 
the exercise of an executive stock option. In addition, there are no restrictions placed on 
executives’ subsequent sale decisions. Our sample period runs to 3 July 1998. The data 
include all executive transactions taking place during this period and is provided by Directus 
Ltd. Table 1 has summary statistics relating to the exercises during this period. Of the 3392 
executive stock option exercises, 148 were removed due to missing returns data. The 
remaining 3244 exercises comprise our sample. 
Table 1 
 For each option exercise, we determine the proportion of stock sold by the executive 
at the time of the exercise. Perhaps the most striking finding is that the average proportion of 
stock sold is approximately 45% of the stock purchased through the exercise of the option. 
This contrasts strongly with the finding of Ofek and Yermack (2000) that US executives sell 
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most of the stock purchased through exercise.3 This disparity is difficult to reconcile given 
that there are no significant differences in the respective personal tax regimes or in the 
restrictions placed on exercising and selling of stock. Conyon and Murphy (2000) contrast 
the differences in CEO remuneration between the United States and the United Kingdom. 
They find that average CEO compensation in the United States is 500% greater than that in 
the United Kingdom. More importantly, valuing stock options at their grant date, US CEOs 
earn 42% of their total remuneration from options, as compared to just 10% in the UK. If the 
exercise of a stock option in the US is regarded as being in lieu of cash remuneration, then it 
is possible that these exercises are generally motivated by liquidity. Stock options in the UK 
represent a much smaller proportion of total executive remuneration, so their exercise is less 
likely to be due to liquidity, and they may therefore be relatively more informative.   
 The number of event days denotes the number of days on which at least one exercise 
takes place. In the context of standard event study methodology, it is evident that there is 
considerable clustering of exercises, with an average of approximately four and a half 
exercises taking place on any particular day. This means that we are unable to use standard 
event study methodology to determine the significance of post-exercise abnormal returns. 
The approach we use is outlined in the methodology section below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 It is possible that executives make subsequent sales of stock. However, sales that occur some time after the 
exercise cannot have an impact on the information content of the exercise, and are therefore ignored. Further, an 
analysis of our data shows that subsequent sales within a month of an exercise are rare. 
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4.  Methodology 
 
Standard event study methodology examines the impact of an event on a firm’s 
returns by calculating post-event abnormal returns using a market model. The estimation of a 
market model would be an inappropriate methodology to use in this context given that the 
exercise of an option will only take place when that option is in the money. This means that 
each event is likely to occur after a period of strongly positive returns, (which we find 
below). Estimation of a market model’s parameters prior to the exercise of the option will 
therefore create a downward bias in the abnormal returns estimated subsequently. We avoid 
this problem by comparing post-exercise returns relative to the returns on a benchmark 
portfolio. These benchmark portfolios are composed according to size and momentum. The 
formation of portfolios on the basis of size and momentum is a similar approach to that taken 
by Carpenter and Remmers (2001). Measuring abnormal returns through the use of matching 
portfolio deciles sorted by size is a common method in the literature. (See, for example, 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Esplenaub, Gregory and Tonks (1998)). The use of a further 
sort by momentum reflects consistent findings of medium-term return persistence observed 
by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and more recently confirmed by Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001). 
Each day, all firms are allocated to one of forty portfolios on the basis of their size 
and previous return (or momentum). We first rank all firms by size, size being measured by 
market capitalisation. This yields ten size-based portfolios. Each of the ten size portfolios (or 
deciles) is then subdivided in four based on a ranking of the cumulative firm returns over the 
year preceding the exercise, a period measured from t - 12 months to t - 30 days (where t 
denotes the day on which the exercise occurs). Equally weighted returns are then calculated 
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for each of these forty benchmark portfolios over the following nine months. The abnormal 
return for any firm on a particular day around an exercise is given by the difference between 
that firm’s return and its matching size/momentum portfolio.  
 The second methodological issue arises from the event clustering that is apparent in 
our data. Overall, 3244 option exercises take place on just 707 days within our sample period. 
As a result, we are unable to assume that the abnormal returns and the cumulative abnormal 
returns associated with each option exercise are independent of each other. This means that 
we cannot simply aggregate the abnormal returns relating to the option exercises, obtain a 
mean and standard deviation and estimate the significance of the resulting cumulative 
abnormal returns. We overcome this problem of event clustering by using a calendar time 
approach (see, for example, the discussion in Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and its 
application in Brav and Gompers (1997)). We measure the abnormal returns around each 
exercise as above and then place these daily abnormal returns in calendar time between July 
1995 and July 1998. To estimate the abnormal return for an event window of, for example, 1 
to 30 days post-event, each day in calendar time we calculate the mean abnormal return to all 
firms that have an exercise between 1 and 30 days prior to that day. Thus the abnormal return 
we calculate for each day in calendar time denotes the mean abnormal return to all those 
exercises that are between 1 and 30 days post-event on that particular day. This gives us a 
time series of abnormal returns from which we can calculate a mean and corresponding 
standard deviation in the normal way, and enables us to estimate the resulting significance 
from zero of the mean abnormal return for any given event window.4 
                                                 
4 As Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) note, the drawback to such an approach is that these computed returns do not 
correspond to returns that would be experienced by investors.  
 13
 We choose a range of event windows, including a pre-event window from day t-30 to 
day t (to measure the immediate pre-exercise return performance), and post-event windows 
up to 9 months after the exercise. The 3 month post-event window may be an especially 
important window given that London Stock Exchange rules do not permit executive 
transactions immediately prior to earnings announcements. Thus the 3 month window might 
best capture the ability of the executive to trade on the basis of information relating to a 
forthcoming earnings announcement.5 
 
5.  Results 
 
As noted above, the predominant focus of this research is to determine whether there 
is information contained in executive stock option exercises. Specifically, we investigate the 
possible importance of the proportion sold at the time of exercise. The summary statistics 
detailed in Table 1 distinguish between ‘Low’ and ‘High’ proportion exercises. We split our 
sample approximately into two, those exercises where more than 50% of the stock is sold, 
and those exercises where 50% or less stock is sold. This yields a slightly higher number of 
exercises in the Low sale group. There is some indication of differences between the two 
samples, Low exercises tending to be in firms with a smaller market capitalisation. In 
addition, there is a substantial difference in the moneyness of the respective samples, the 
moneyness of Low exercises being greater than that of High exercises. As a result, we control 
for both firm size and option moneyness.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Insiders are entitled to trade providing they do not base their decisions on price sensitive information. 
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5.1.  Proportion Sold 
 
This section investigates the information content of an option exercise, taking account 
of the amount of stock sold at the time of exercise. At exercise, an executive can choose 
either to hold or to sell the stock acquired through exercise. This choice is likely to be 
influenced by a number of factors, one of which may be the executive’s expectations about 
the future performance of the stock. It is normally assumed, however, that an executive will 
sell all the stock acquired. The reason for this is that there are no costs associated with 
holding the option other than the dividends foregone, while exercising requires payment of 
both the exercise price and income tax on the paper profit at the time of exercise. The costs 
related to exercising suggest that exercise will occur only if the executive expects the stock to 
underperform, and should therefore be accompanied by a sale of all the stock purchased at 
exercise. Thus an exercise might realistically be viewed by investors as a signal akin to a 
stock sale.  
It is not necessary that the decision to exercise and sell be ascribed to expectations of 
poor performance. Irrespective of an executive’s expectations about the firm’s prospects, a 
decision to exercise and sell might reflect a rational desire to diversify the executive’s 
portfolio. If this were the case, there does not appear to be any clear rationale for the exercise 
and sale of a proportion of stock. Diversification of some fraction of an option holding can be 
achieved by exercising that fraction and selling all the stock exercised. Exercising options 
relating to more stock than is actually sold will incur unnecessary costs. Therefore, an 
exercise purely for diversification should be accompanied by the sale of all stock purchased.  
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Alternatively, a decision to exercise could be due, for example, to the expiration of 
the option. In this case, the executive’s choice concerning the amount of stock to sell will be 
complicated by the need to balance both the costs associated with the exercise and the 
executive’s expectations about the future performance of the stock. The decision to exercise 
and hold requires the executive to make an actual investment in the stock, given that 
exercising the option can incur substantial costs. Thus an executive may sell a proportion of 
the stock acquired even if he expects superior future performance of that stock.  
We hypothesise, therefore, that post-event abnormal returns will be influenced by the 
proportion of stock that is sold following a stock option exercise. Specifically, we argue that 
where an executive sells a large proportion of the stock purchased, we would expect post-
event abnormal returns to be consistent with those following a stock sale. Alternatively, 
where an executive sells a small proportion of the stock purchased, we would expect 
subsequent abnormal returns to be more in line with those observed for stock purchases6. A 
subdivision of exercises by proportion sold should yield a set of information signals 
consistent with either a purchase or a sale if executives use their private information in 
motivating their exercise and related sale decisions. The alternative factors behind a decision 
to exercise, such as diversification or option expiration, will naturally blur the quality of the 
                                                 
6 Previous research has documented post-transaction negative and positive abnormal returns for stock sales and 
purchases respectively. While purchases have consistently given stronger signals than sales, the most recent 
research suggests that only stock purchases produce significant post-transaction abnormal returns. The reason 
for this is based on liquidity - the executive has to fund a purchase. In our analysis, a Low proportion exercise 
will not be exactly equivalent to a purchase since the sale of a small proportion of the stock exercised may yield 
an approximately zero net cash position for the executive. The possible absence of a funding requirement for the 
transaction therefore suggests that a Low proportion exercise may not be as informative as a standard purchase. 
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proportion sold as an information signal. As a result, the proportion sold at the time of 
exercise may be a noisy indicator of future stock performance.  
Table 2 
The results for the complete sample of exercises in Table 2 show that exercises follow 
significant positive abnormal returns in the 30 days prior to exercise. Post-exercise, we find 
small, but insignificant, negative abnormal returns. For example, the mean abnormal return 
over the six-month period following exercise is -0.31% (t-statistic of –0.60). This is not out 
of line with Carpenter and Remmers, who find that when an executive can sell exercised 
stock immediately, post-exercise abnormal returns are marginally positive but not significant. 
(They obtain a mean abnormal return over the corresponding period of 0.18%). The 
implication of these results is that the exercise decision may be timed to capitalise on 
previous superior stock price performance, but contains little information about a firm’s 
future performance. 
 Rows 2 and 3 in Table 2 give the corresponding results for exercises categorised as 
low and high proportion respectively. A ‘Low’ exercise is one where the executive sells 50% 
or less of the stock acquired, while ‘High’ denotes an exercise with an accompanying sale of 
more than 50%. Both Low and High exercises take place after a period of significantly 
positive abnormal returns over the preceding 30 days (1.01% and 4.02% respectively). The 
difference between them is significant, indicating that executives sell a greater proportion of 
stock after larger recent abnormal returns. This suggests that the exercise and sell decision 
may be influenced by the recent performance of the stock price, i.e. the extent of the price 
run-up during the 30 days prior to exercise impacts upon the proportion of stock sold at 
exercise. Thus not only do executives appear to time their exercises, the choice regarding 
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how much of the stock acquired at exercise that they then sell appears to be related to a desire 
to capture these short-term gains.  
This analysis is reinforced by the post-event abnormal returns of the two subsamples. 
Low exercises yield subsequent abnormal returns that are consistently positive, while High 
exercises are followed by negative abnormal returns. For example, the six-month post-
exercise abnormal return is 1.32% (t-statistic of 2.13) and –2.19% (t-statistic of –2.95) after 
Low and High exercises respectively. The difference in returns is 3.52% (t-statistic of 3.63), 
and 5.23% (t-statistic of 3.99) when measured over a nine-month post-exercise window.  
It is apparent that executives sell a larger proportion of stock after a period of superior 
stock price performance, and prior to a period of relative underperformance. These results are 
consistent with our initial hypothesis that it may be possible to categorise exercises as being 
approximately equivalent to stock sales or stock purchases depending on the proportion of 
stock that the executive sells at exercise. Despite the fact that there may be a number of non-
information based reasons for executives to exercise, there is clear evidence that executives 
not only time their exercises to take advantage of short-term price appreciation, but that the 
associated decisions regarding how much stock to sell are well informed. In contrast to 
previous research, we are therefore able to conclude that insiders do make use of their 
information advantage when exercising their executive stock options. 
In arriving at this conclusion, we assume that stock return performance post-exercise 
is independent of stock return performance pre-exercise. If this were not the case, and 
insiders’ decisions on how much exercised stock to sell is simply determined by pre-exercise 
performance, we would be unable to conclude that insiders make use of an information 
advantage over outsiders. We identify in Table 2 above that there is an apparent relation 
between pre- and post-exercise performance. Specifically, exercises accompanied by the sale 
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of a high proportion of stock follow significantly greater abnormal returns prior to exercise. 
This pre-exercise return performance is then reversed over the following nine months. In 
Table 3 we present the results of samples of exercises categorised according to the nature of 
the immediate pre-exercise stock returns. We split our sample of exercises into two on the 
basis of a ranking of their pre-exercise abnormal returns measured from day t-30. We denote 
these two subsamples as ‘Good’ and ‘Poor’ respectively. Exercises with good prior return 
performance exhibit generally positive post-exercise abnormal returns, while the reverse is 
the case for those exercises with poor pre-exercise returns. The Poor sample significantly 
underperforms the Good sample over the subsequent 6 and 9 month windows. Table 3 also 
presents the results of a further subdivision of these two samples according to the proportion 
of stock sold at exercise. Both the Good (Low – High) and Poor (Low – High) are positive 
and significant for windows of 3 months or more post-exercise, i.e. irrespective of pre-
exercise returns, the low sale proportion exercises consistently outperform the high sale 
proportion exercises. This indicates that post-exercise return performance cannot be 
explained by immediate pre-exercise returns. It is therefore clear that conditioning on the 
proportion of stock sold at the time of exercise yields significant information regarding future 
return performance over and above any information contained in previous returns.   
Table 3 
 
5.2.  Option Moneyness 
 
This section presents results relating to exercises categorised by the moneyness of the 
option at the time of exercise. The moneyness of the option exercise is the ratio of the stock 
price to the exercise price. Moneyness may be an important consideration for executives 
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when deciding to exercise. While the option must be in the money, the extent to which it is in 
the money not only impacts on the explicit cost of exercising (as outlined above), but also on 
the implicit cost of exercising. As a result of these costs, we argue that near-the-money 
exercises are more likely to be information driven. Equivalently, deep-in-the-money 
exercises are more likely to be diversification or liquidity motivated. 
 When an option is exercised, the option holder loses the time value of the option. This 
time value is greater for a near-the-money option, so exercising such an option is relatively 
expensive. Conversely, a deep in-the-money option has relatively little time value. This 
relation between cost of exercising and moneyness suggests that an executive should be more 
likely to exercise a near-the-money option if he has negative information concerning the 
stock. Equivalently, the exercise of a deep in-the-money option is less likely to be 
information induced. We therefore hypothesise that, other things being equal, a near-the-
money exercise will be followed by negative abnormal returns.  
Approximately ten percent of our exercises were missing an exercise price and were 
therefore excluded from this part of the analysis. All remaining exercises were ranked by 
moneyness, yielding a total sample of 2938 events. These events were split into two equal 
samples, which we categorise as near-the-money and deep in-the-money.   
Table 4 
 Table 4 presents the results. Deep in-the-money exercises take place after a period of 
large positive abnormal returns that are significantly greater than those prior to near-the-
money exercises. This is not surprising since pre-exercise run-up is likely to be a factor that 
determines the moneyness of the exercise. More interestingly, we find negative abnormal 
returns at all horizons for the near-the-money exercises, while corresponding returns for the 
deep in-the-money exercises are positive but insignificant. For example, over the six months 
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after exercise, the abnormal returns are –1.40% (t-statistic of –1.93) and 0.61% (t-statistic of 
0.79) respectively.  
Near-the-money exercises follow positive abnormal returns, and produce significantly 
negative post-exercise abnormal returns. Pre-exercise abnormal returns are significantly 
larger for deep in-the-money exercises, and are followed by marginally positive abnormal 
returns. These results are consistent with the notion that an executive is more likely to 
exercise and capture the profits associated with a near-the-money option if he expects poor 
stock price performance. This is in line with our intuition that a near-the-money exercise is 
relatively more expensive. A near-the-money exercise should therefore be viewed as a 
negative signal, consistent with our hypothesis that such an exercise is likely to be induced by 
negative private information.  
While our results are intuitively appealing, they implicitly assume that the sale 
proportion and moneyness are independent. It would, however, be realistic to expect 
executives to sell a higher proportion of a near-the-money exercise given that a near-the-
money exercise requires proportionately more stock to be sold to fund the exercise. As noted 
in Table 1, this indeed appears to be the case. Disentangling these two factors is crucial in 
determining whether post-exercise negative abnormal returns are related to a high sell 
proportion or the moneyness of the option at exercise. We overcome this by subdividing the 
near and in-the-money samples by the proportion sold. This creates four samples, a Low and 
High sale proportion for both the near and deep in-the-money exercises. 
Table 5 
The results in Table 5 broadly confirm our earlier findings that the proportion sold is 
an important indicator of post-exercise returns. There are significant differences between low 
and high sale proportions whether the option is near or deep in-the-money, although there is 
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some evidence to suggest that this difference is stronger for the near-the-money options, i.e. 
near-the-money exercises are generally more informative than deep in-the-money exercises. 
At the same time, it is interesting to note that the moneyness of the option is also important. 
High sale proportions produce significant negative abnormal returns only for the near-the-
money options, whereas low sale proportions yield significant positive abnormal returns only 
for the deep in-the-money options. This suggests that a combination of proportion sold and 
moneyness is driving the post-event abnormal returns. 
These results indicate that there may be information only in high sale proportion near-
the-money exercises and low sale proportion deep in-the-money exercises. Thus a near-the-
money exercise will indicate poor subsequent performance, particularly if accompanied by a 
high sale proportion. The six-month post-exercise returns are 0.76% (t-statistic of 0.84) and –
3.57% (t-statistic of –3.59) for near-the-money low and high sale proportions respectively. 
Similarly, a deep in-the-money exercise has little significant information value, unless 
accompanied by a low sale proportion. We obtain corresponding six-month post-exercise 
abnormal returns of 1.61% (t-statistic of 1.92) and –0.81% (t-statistic of –0.63).  
Overall, these findings provide additional support for insiders’ use of their 
information advantage when making their exercise decisions. Further, the use of this private 
information is consistent with a priori expectations, in particular that near-the-money 
exercises are indicative of poor future return performance. We have shown, however, that 
near-the-money exercises only indicate post-exercise negative abnormal returns if the 
executive sells a high proportion of the stock. The distinction between high and low sale 
proportions is clearly an important indicator of subsequent abnormal returns following deep 
in-the-money exercises. 
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5.3.  Firm Size 
 
In this section, we examine whether our results are driven by a small firm effect. It is 
possible that exercises by executives in smaller firms are more informative than exercises by 
executives in larger firms. This follows if investors are at a greater informational 
disadvantage in the smaller firms. We also need to consider firm size given that the mean 
market capitalisation of the Low exercises is less than that of the High exercises. We first 
rank all exercises by the size of the firm at the time of exercise, and partition our sample in 
two. We then subdivide each by the proportion sold in order to ensure that our results are not 
due to differing sale proportions within the two subsamples. Our findings are presented in 
Table 6.  
Table 6 
We find that there is no difference between the small and large firm abnormal returns. 
Low and high proportion sales continue to produce signals in line with those observed above 
in Section 5.1, both for the small and larger firms. The difference in six-month post-exercise 
abnormal return between low and high sale proportion exercises in the smaller firm sample is 
3.5% (t-statistic of 2.64). The corresponding difference for the larger firm sample is 3.22% (t-
statistic of 2.34). There is no asymmetry in the informational advantage of executives 
depending on the size of the firm. Further, these results stress the importance of the 
proportion sold at the time of exercise over and above a factor such as firm size. 
  
5.4.  Age of Executive 
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Finally, we investigate the importance of the type or rank of executive in determining 
the nature of the post-exercise abnormal returns. It is generally considered that the rank of 
executive is an important factor in determining the information content of an insider’s 
transaction. The higher the rank of the executive, the better informed they should be about 
the firm’s future prospects. Carpenter and Remmers distinguish between exercises by high 
ranked and low ranked insiders, high-ranking managers being board chairmen or presidents. 
In the current regime where insiders can sell on exercise, they obtain six-month post-exercise 
abnormal returns of –0.12% and 0.84% for top and lower-ranked managers respectively. It is 
only when they subdivide further by size of firm that they obtain significant post-exercise 
abnormal returns of –5.22% for exercises by high ranked insiders in the smaller firms. 
 Our data does not enable us to determine the ranking of the executive. However, we 
do have some information concerning the age of the executive at the time of the exercise. The 
age of the executive may be an important information signal. There is likely to be a 
correlation between executive age and position within the firm, implying that older 
executives should be better informed. Alternatively, the wish to diversify or satisfy liquidity 
requirements may vary with age. A priori, it is not obvious how these various factors will 
impact on the timing of an exercise, as they may produce conflicting motives for transacting 
and hence produce ambiguous information signals. 
Table 7 
Unfortunately, the data on age is not comprehensive, being available only for a subset 
of exercises. However, because the analysis of age is unique to the examination of not just 
the exercise of executive stock options but also to executive trades in general, we believe we 
are justified in continuing with a restricted sample. Excluding exercises without data on the 
age of the executive gives us a sample of 2302 exercises, a reduction of approximately 30%. 
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The first row of Table 7 gives the results for the whole of our reduced sample. Both pre- and 
post-exercise returns are in line with those for the complete sample of exercises presented in 
Table 2 above. There is therefore no evidence that this restricted sample is biased in relation 
to the complete sample.  
We first rank exercises by age of executive at the time of exercise, and divide the 
sample equally in two – young and old. This produces a somewhat arbitrary division, with 
young being categorised as those aged approximately 52 or below, old as being above 52. We 
then subdivide each on the basis of proportion sold, again to reflect the importance of this as 
a factor in explaining post-exercise returns. The reduction in sample sizes means that the 
resulting significance levels of the computed abnormal returns are generally lower than those 
obtained above. Table 7 shows that while there is little evidence of a significant difference 
between old and young post-exercise returns, an interesting pattern emerges. For example, 
the mean 6-month post-exercise abnormal return for a low sale proportion exercise is 2.22% 
(t-statistic of 2.12) and 1.09% (t-statistic of 1.28) for young and old executives respectively. 
The corresponding returns after a high sale proportion exercise are –2.3% (t-statistic of –
2.40) and –1.5% (t-statistic of –1.57). Although these differences are not significant, they 
suggest that the signals generated from exercises by younger executives are consistently more 
informative than those generated from the corresponding exercises by older executives. 
While we are unable to draw firm conclusions from this, a more detailed examination on a 
larger sample would be of interest, given that we would expect the older executives to have a 
higher rank and therefore possess more private information. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
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Executives derive increasing proportions of their remuneration from executive stock 
options. Their ability to use private information in their exercise decisions impacts directly 
upon both the value of these options and the remuneration they receive. This study identifies 
that there is information content in executive stock option exercises, contrary to the 
conclusions of previous research. Principally, the proportion of stock sold at the time of 
exercise determines the direction of post-exercise abnormal returns. The sale of a low 
proportion of the stock acquired through exercise is consistent with subsequently superior 
stock return performance, while the reverse is observed for an exercise and sale of a high 
proportion of stock. These findings indicate that insiders do make use of their private 
information when deciding when to exercise their stock options, and how much of the stock 
acquired through this exercise they should sell. In contrast to previous research on standard 
insider purchases and sales, we find that the sale of a high proportion of stock (which we 
categorise as a sale) is consistently more informative than the sale of a low proportion of 
stock (categorised as a purchase).  
The importance of the proportion of stock sold by the insider at the time of exercise is 
robust to both the moneyness of the option and the size of the firm. Our moneyness results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that the exercise of a near-the-money option is likely to 
indicate negative private information because the exercise of such an option is relatively 
expensive due to the time value of the option foregone. Finally, we present the results of an 
examination of the relation between the age of the executive at the time of exercise and the 
post-exercise stock price performance. This is an analysis unique to any investigation of the 
information content of trading by insiders, and one which further research in this area might 
explore.  
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 Table 1 UK Executive Stock Option Exercises - Summary Statistics 
Stock Option Exercises July 1995 – July 1998 
  No. of 
Exercises 
No. of Firms No. of Event 
Days 
Mkt. Cap. (£m) Moneyness 
       
All  3244 765 707 2909 6.86 
       
Low  1727 583 600 2687 8.18 
       
High  1517 484 566 3162 4.74 
       
 
All represents all exercises occurring between July 1995 and July 1998 for which we have corresponding 
returns data. Low represents those exercises that are accompanied by a sale of 50% or less of the stock 
purchased through the exercise. High represents exercises accompanied by a sale of more than 50% of the stock 
purchased. No. of firms is the number of firms for which there is at least one option exercise in the respective 
categories. No. of Event Days denotes the number of days during the sample period on which at least one 
exercise occurs. Mkt. Cap. is the mean market capitalisation of the firm at the time of exercise. Moneyness is 
the mean of the ratio of the stock price to the exercise price at the time of exercise. 
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 Table 2 Abnormal Returns around Option Exercises Categorised by Proportion Sold 
Stock Option Exercises July 1995 – July 1998 
 -30 to 0 +30 days +3 months +6 months +9 months 
      
All 2.26 -0.10 -0.45 -0.31 -0.75 
 [8.79] [-0.51] [-1.30] [-0.60] [-1.06] 
      
Low 1.01 0.23 0.73 1.32 1.77 
 [3.02] [0.53] [1.80] [2.13] [2.08] 
      
High 4.02 -0.42 -1.72 -2.19 -3.46 
 [11.73] [-1.34] [-3.36] [-2.95] [-3.47] 
      
Low - High -3.00 0.65 2.45 3.52 5.23 
 [-6.27] [1.61] [3.75] [3.63] [3.99] 
      
 
All denotes the mean percentage abnormal return for the complete sample of exercises, while Low (High) 
represent the corresponding abnormal return for exercises accompanied by a sale of 50% or less (more than 
50%) of the stock purchased at exercise. Low - High is the difference between the Low and High abnormal 
returns. Mean percentage abnormal returns are measured over the respective windows using a calendar time 
methodology. Calendar day abnormal returns are the mean abnormal returns to all those firms that have an 
event such that they lie within the particular window on that day. A firm’s abnormal return each day is that 
firm’s return minus the firm’s respective size/momentum portfolio return. The corresponding t-statistics, 
measuring significance from zero, are in brackets. 
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Table 3 Abnormal Returns around Option Exercises Categorised by Previous Stock 
Performance and Proportion Sold 
Stock Option Exercises July 1995 – July 1998 
 -30 to 0 +30 days +3 months +6 months +9 months 
      
Good 8.87 -0.05 -0.22 0.99 1.14 
 [22.28] [-0.17] [-0.44] [1.33] [1.14] 
      
Poor -4.74 -0.36 -0.88 -1.72 -2.67 
 [-15.97] [-1.30] [-1.95] [-2.56] [-2.97] 
      
Good - Poor 13.61 0.31 0.66 2.72 3.81 
 [27.41] [0.77] [0.98] [2.70] [2.84] 
      
Good 0.29 1.06 1.87 2.61 5.38 
Low-High [0.39] [1.91] [2.10] [1.94] [2.94] 
      
Poor -2.86 0.94 3.51 5.06 6.35 
Low-High [-4.82] [1.08] [3.95] [3.90] [3.76] 
      
 
Good and Poor represent the mean percentage abnormal return for exercises that follow relatively superior and 
inferior previous returns respectively. The previous returns are the abnormal returns measured over the 30 days 
prior to the option exercise. Good – Poor is the difference between the Good and Poor abnormal returns. Low 
(High) represent exercises accompanied by a sale of 50% or less (more than 50%) of the stock purchased at 
exercise. Good (Low - High) is the difference between the Low and High abnormal returns for exercises 
following superior previous returns. Poor (Low - High) is the difference between the Low and High abnormal 
returns for exercises following inferior previous returns. Mean percentage abnormal returns are measured over 
the respective windows using a calendar time methodology. Calendar day abnormal returns are the mean 
abnormal returns to all those firms that have an event such that they lie within the particular window on that 
day. A firm’s abnormal return each day is that firm’s return minus the firm’s respective size/momentum 
portfolio return. The corresponding t-statistics, measuring significance from zero, are in brackets. 
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Table 4 Abnormal Returns around Option Exercises Categorised by Moneyness 
Stock Option Exercises July 1995 – July 1998 
 -30 to 0 +30 days +3 months +6 months +9 months 
      
All 2.28 -0.19 -0.58 -0.39 -0.75 
 [8.55] [-0.89] [-1.61] [-0.72] [-1.01] 
      
NTM 1.44 -0.62 -1.27 -1.40 -1.79 
 [4.43] [-2.17] [-2.64] [-1.93] [-1.83] 
      
ITM 3.19 0.18 0.14 0.61 0.28 
 [8.17] [0.59] [0.26] [0.79] [0.26] 
      
NTM - ITM -1.74 -0.80 -1.41 -2.00 -2.07 
 [-3.46] [-1.90] [-1.95] [-1.90] [-1.45] 
      
 
All denotes the mean percentage abnormal return for the complete sample of exercises, while NTM and ITM 
represent the corresponding abnormal return for exercises that are near-the-money and deep in-the-money 
respectively. NTM - ITM is the difference between the near-the-money and the in-the-money abnormal returns. 
Mean percentage abnormal returns are measured over the respective windows using a calendar time 
methodology. Calendar day abnormal returns are the mean abnormal returns to all those firms that have an 
event such that they lie within the particular window on that day. A firm’s abnormal return each day is that 
firm’s return minus the firm’s respective size/momentum portfolio return. The corresponding t-statistics, 
measuring significance from zero, are in brackets. 
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Table 5 Abnormal Returns around Option Exercises Categorised by Moneyness and 
Proportion Sold 
Stock Option Exercises July 1995 – July 1998 
 -30 to 0 +30 days +3 months +6 months +9 months 
      
NTM 0.20 -0.29 0.26 0.76 1.09 
Low [0.49] [-0.80] [0.44] [0.84] [0.88] 
      
NTM 3.00 -1.08 -2.84 -3.57 -4.59 
High [7.59] [-2.63] [-4.28] [-3.59] [-3.53] 
      
NTM -2.80 0.79 3.10 4.33 5.68 
Low – High [-4.85] [1.44] [3.50] [3.21] [3.17] 
      
ITM 1.79 0.48 0.96 1.61 2.32 
Low [3.47] [1.37] [1.67] [1.92] [2.05] 
      
ITM 5.93 -0.14 -1.03 -0.81 -2.81 
High [9.61] [-0.27] [-1.04] [-0.63] [-1.66] 
      
ITM -4.14 0.62 1.98 2.42 5.13 
Low – High [-5.16] [0.99] [1.74] [1.58] [2.52] 
      
 
NTM and ITM represent the mean percentage abnormal return for exercises that are near-the-money and deep 
in-the-money respectively. Low (High) represent exercises accompanied by a sale of 50% or less (more than 
50%) of the stock purchased at exercise. Thus NTM (Low) represents the abnormal return for near-the-money 
exercises that have a corresponding low sale proportion, while NTM (High) represents the abnormal return for 
near-the-money exercises that have a corresponding high sale proportion. NTM (Low - High) is the difference 
between the Low and High abnormal returns for the near-the-money exercises. ITM (Low - High) is the 
difference between the Low and High abnormal returns for the in-the-money exercises. Mean percentage 
abnormal returns are measured over the respective windows using a calendar time methodology. Calendar day 
abnormal returns are the mean abnormal returns to all those firms that have an event such that they lie within 
the particular window on that day. A firm’s abnormal return each day is that firm’s return minus the firm’s 
respective size/momentum portfolio return. The corresponding t-statistics, measuring significance from zero, are 
in brackets. 
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Table 6 Abnormal Returns around Option Exercises Categorised by Size of Firm and 
Proportion Sold 
Stock Option Exercises July 1995 – July 1998 
 -30 to 0 +30 days +3 months +6 months +9 months 
      
Small 1.40 0.32 1.06 1.37 1.57 
Low [2.88] [0.96] [1.84] [1.60] [1.37] 
      
Small 3.85 -0.27 -1.32 -2.14 -3.42 
High [7.76] [-0.60] [-1.76] [-2.11] [-2.64] 
      
Small -2.45 0.59 2.37 3.50 4.98 
Low - High [-3.52] [1.04] [2.52] [2.64] [2.88] 
      
Large 0.48 0.03 0.18 1.13 2.05 
Low [1.19] [0.09] [0.29] [1.22] [1.62] 
      
Large 4.08 -0.52 -2.13 -2.09 -3.40 
High [9.63] [-1.39] [-3.30] [-2.07] [-2.51] 
      
Large -3.61 0.56 2.31 3.22 5.45 
Low - High [-6.17] [1.04] [2.61] [2.34] [2.94] 
      
 
Small and Large represent the mean percentage abnormal return for exercises in firms categorised as small and 
large market capitalisation respectively. Low (High) represent exercises accompanied by a sale of 50% or less 
(more than 50%) of the stock purchased at exercise. Thus Small (Low) represents the abnormal return for 
exercises of firms with a small market capitalisation that have a corresponding low sale proportion, while Small 
(High) represents the abnormal return for exercises of firms with a small market capitalisation that have a 
corresponding high sale proportion. Small (Low - High) is the difference between the Low and High abnormal 
returns for the small firms. Large (Low - High) is the difference between the Low and High abnormal returns 
for the large firms. Mean percentage abnormal returns are measured over the respective windows using a 
calendar time methodology. Calendar day abnormal returns are the mean abnormal returns to all those firms that 
have an event such that they lie within the particular window on that day. A firm’s abnormal return each day is 
that firm’s return minus the firm’s respective size/momentum portfolio return. The corresponding t-statistics, 
measuring significance from zero, are in brackets. 
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Table 7 Abnormal Returns around Option Exercises Categorised by Age of Executive 
and Proportion Sold 
Stock Option Exercises July 1995 – July 1998 
 -30 to 0 +30 days +3 months +6 months +9 months 
      
All 2.62 -0.15 -0.61 -0.48 -0.77 
 [8.88] [-0.62] [-1.55] [-0.81] [-0.93] 
      
Old 0.53 0.20 0.65 1.09 2.23 
Low [1.17] [0.56] [1.17] [1.28] [1.83] 
      
Young 2.45 0.35 0.87 2.22 3.52 
Low [4.20] [0.81] [1.28] [2.12] [2.55] 
      
Old – Young -1.93 -0.15 -0.21 -1.11 -1.28 
Low  [-2.61] [-0.27] [-0.24] [-0.84] [-0.70] 
      
Old 3.96 -0.33 -1.26 -1.50 -2.93 
High [8.43] [-0.84] [-2.03] [-1.57] [-2.24] 
      
Young 3.83 -0.46 -1.84 -2.30 -3.76 
High [8.69] [-1.17] [-2.80] [-2.40] [-2.94] 
      
Old – Young 0.13 0.13 0.58 0.80 0.83 
High [0.20] [0.23] [0.64] [0.60] [0.45] 
      
 
All denotes the mean percentage abnormal return for the complete sample of exercises that have associated data 
on the age of the executive at the time of exercise. Old and Young represent the abnormal return for exercises 
categorised as being by the older and younger executives respectively. Low (High) represent exercises 
accompanied by a sale of 50% or less (more than 50%) of the stock purchased at exercise. Thus Old (Low) 
represents the abnormal return for exercises by the older executives that have a corresponding low sale 
proportion, while Old (High) represents the abnormal return for exercises by the older executives that have a 
corresponding high sale proportion. Old - Young (Low) is the difference in abnormal return between the Old 
and Young exercises that have a corresponding low sale proportion. Old - Young (High) is the difference in 
abnormal return between the Old and Young exercises that have a corresponding high sale proportion. Mean 
percentage abnormal returns are measured over the respective windows using a calendar time methodology. 
Calendar day abnormal returns are the mean abnormal returns to all those firms that have an event such that 
they lie within the particular window on that day. A firm’s abnormal return each day is that firm’s return minus 
the firm’s respective size/momentum portfolio return. The corresponding t-statistics, measuring significance 
from zero, are in brackets. 
 
